

CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS FOR LANGUAGE EDUCATION: UNVEILING POWER, IDEOLOGY AND MANIPULATION IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE

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Abstract: The present paper focuses on the introduction of a new integrative problem-oriented analytical tool, the Power, Ideology and Manipulation Identification (PIMI) instrument, which was created for the analysis of political discourse, through adapting the most recent theories and methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. The study defines the meaning of *power*, *ideology* and *manipulation*, and attempts to trace their characteristic features in political discourse. These three concepts are of notable importance in the latest Critical Discourse Analysis literature, though the relations between them have not yet been entirely clarified. The present paper discusses the three concepts in parallel, whilst also introducing the new instrument, which has been built on the basis of two existing critical discourse analytical models (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997; van Dijk, 2006). Through presenting the results of the pilot analysis of a relevant piece of political discourse conducted using the new analytical instrument, the study also draws conclusions regarding the interconnected relationship between the three concepts examined. The data gained during the analysis indicate that inequality and polarization are significant elements in the case of each construct, and the results of the analysis also show that despite several overlaps, each concept has its own characteristic profile.

Keywords: Critical Discourse Analysis, power, ideology, manipulation, PIMI analytical instrument

1 Introduction

Power, ideology and manipulation are key concepts in recent Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) literature. However, their complex mechanisms and the relationships between them have not yet been fully explained. Several authors (Chartesis-Black, 2014; Chilton & Schäffner, 1997; Dahl, 1957; Foucault, 1980; Fowler, 1985; Gramsci, 1980; Kress, 1985; van Dijk, 1996, 1998, 2006; Wodak, 1989) investigated the meanings and properties of these phenomena, without highlighting the exact relationship between them. Based on the main theories of CDA, the present paper focuses on the elusive concepts of power, ideology and manipulation, their relationship to one other, and the possible modes of operationalizing them.

One of the aims of this paper is to introduce a new integrative, problem-oriented analytic tool, the so-called ‘Power, Ideology and Manipulation Identification’ (PIMI) instrument, created on the basis of various theories and methods of CDA. The new instrument was established by merging together two existing analytical models (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997; van Dijk, 2006). The parent frameworks have been further developed to be able to provide a complex, theory- and data-based analytical tool that is capable of identifying the signs of power, ideologies and manipulation in political discourse. The instrument has also been enriched through the recommendations and insight of other linguistic and CDA theories and methods (Chilton, 2004; Clark, 1996; Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Foucault, 1980; Gramsci, 1980; Guiraud, Longin, Lorini, Pesty, & Rivière, 2011; Hamilton, 2012; Hoey, 2001; Norrick, 1978; Searle, 1976, 1979; Seidel, 1985; van Dijk, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2008, 2011; Vanderveken, 1990; Weiss & Wodak, 2003; White, 1992; Wodak, 1989, 2007; Wodak & Meyer, 2009).

Another aim of the paper is to provide an in-depth analysis of a well-known manipulative political speech (Blair, 2003), through the application of the aforementioned analytical instrument. The speech is worthy of exploration as it has up-to-date political consequences worldwide, including the Iraqi war, international terrorism, the rise of ISIS, and the following humanitarian catastrophes (Hussain, 2015). The present study hopes to provide an aid to understanding the meaning of the speech, its context, and the hidden linguistic mechanisms below the surface. Last but not least, the study also aims to discover the most important underlying factors of the persuasive strength of the text.

CDA investigates the way power, ideology and manipulation appear in discourse, and the procedures by which they create and maintain social and political inequality, power abuse and domination, through language. Fairclough and Wodak (1997) stress that ideological functions, as well as the relations of power in discourse, are usually invisible to the audience, therefore CDA aims to make these invisible aspects apparent. Chilton and Schäffner (1997), Fowler (1985), Fairclough and Wodak (1997), Kress (1985), Seidel (1985), van Dijk (1996, 1998, 2001, 2006, 2011), Wodak (1989, 2007) and others offer several linguistic analytical methods to decipher hidden signs of power, ideologies and manipulation in political discourse. The present study also intends to highlight the significance and main characteristics of these concepts, by stepping further into the search and also by examining the relationship between them. In the following sections of the introduction, the meanings of the three examined concepts are clarified and the parent frameworks are described.

1.1 Theoretical background

1.1.1 Key concepts: Power, ideology, manipulation

Power

Power has had various interpretations over time. Dahl (1957) lists words such as ‘*influence*’, ‘*control*’ and ‘*authority*’, and claims that although these concepts are different, there may be one single notion which seems to lie behind all of them. However, as believed by Dahl, it is not likely to be able to produce a single, consistent, coherent theory of power. We are more likely to create a variety of theories of limited scope, each of which uses some definition of power that is helpful in the context of that particular piece of research. Therefore, the definitions of power may be distinct in important respects, for different studies (Dahl, 1957, p. 202).

Amongst the diverse definitions, it is important to note Foucault (1980), who claims that power is everywhere, and therefore defines power relations as complex mechanisms of society. Gramsci (1980) also focuses on the complexity of the concept of power, and highlights the relations of force, when talking about power. He believes that power is exercised through ideologies; moreover, he proposes that power and ideology are inseparable. According to recent CDA theory, power is a transitive concept entailing an asymmetrical relationship, and these power relationships are not natural and objective, but rather artificial and socially-constructed realities (Fowler, 1985). Fowler declares that “power is the ability of people and institutions to control the behaviour and material lives of others” (1985, p. 61). Van Dijk (1996) theorises that power is a fundamental notion in the examination of group relations in society. He claims that social power is a kind of control which one group has over another. Those in power may define the overall aims

or goals of an event or schedule, provide the agenda, and control other circumstances of text and talk. Gramsci (1980), Fowler (1985) and van Dijk (1996) define the essence of power as a kind of relation, in which asymmetry and control are inevitably present. Fowler (1985) and van Dijk (1996) claim that this asymmetry becomes powerful through the use of language. Language is an instrument for enforcing and exploiting existing positions of authority and privilege in certain ways, such as regulations or commands, and the use of language constitutes the statuses and roles which serve as a basis for people to exercise power.

On the basis of these definitions, power might be considered by distinguishing at least two levels. In a broad sense, power encompasses everything connected to a certain asymmetry in the relationship between people. If political power is interpreted more precisely, it can be associated strictly with outright force. This paper focuses on social and political power, which entails the ability to control the behaviour of other people through language, therefore the emphasis is placed on the stricter definition, where power is connected to overt force.

Ideology

Definitions of *ideology* are also multifarious, seemingly with none being able to capture all of the complexities of the phenomenon. Classical definitions convey negative, critical concepts such as ‘wrong’, ‘false’, ‘distorted’ or ‘misguided beliefs’, mainly related to our social or political opponents (van Dijk, 1998). Representatives of recent CDA provide more elaborate explanations. Kress (1985, p. 29), claims that the term ‘ideology’ is used in literature to refer to various concepts, ranging from the notions of a ‘system of ideas’, ‘beliefs’ or a ‘worldview’ to more contested ones such as, ‘false consciousness’ or ‘ideas of the dominant ruling class.’ Kress (1985) posits that ideologies find their clearest articulation in language, therefore a powerful way of examining ideological structure is through the examination of language. According to van Dijk (1996, 1998), the notion of ideology denotes complex sets of phenomena. He claims that ideologies control how language users take part in distinct discourse as members of different groups, sometimes in dominant positions, other times in dominated positions. He adds that ideologies also establish links between discourse and society, and that at the same time discourse is necessary to reproduce ideologies of different groups. Fairclough and Wodak (1997) stress that discourse does ideological work, and that ideologies are often unjustifiable or ungrounded constructions of society. Moreover they claim that, “ideologies are particular ways of representing and constructing society which reproduce unequal relations of power, relations of domination and exploitation” (1997, p. 275). Van Dijk (1998) emphasizes the vagueness of this notion, highlighting the resulting theoretical confusion of its analysis, although, on the basis of the various interpretations, the emphasis seems to be placed on the relationship between power and language in all definitions of ideology. The considerations suggest that ideology unfurls in discourse and is strongly reliant on power.

Manipulation

Manipulation is defined by van Dijk (2006, p. 359) as a complex phenomenon which involves social power abuse, cognitive mind control, and discursive interaction. Van Dijk claims that manipulation is a “communicative and interactional practice, in which a manipulator exercises control over other people, usually against their will or against their best interest” (2006, p. 360). He goes on to add that manipulation incorporates power, generally the abuse of power, which is a kind of domination, and entails the practice of an illegitimate influence by means of discourse. Van Dijk (2006, p. 361) asserts that the boundary between manipulation and legitimate persuasion

is fuzzy and context-dependent. In the case of legitimate persuasion, the interlocutors have the necessary information and knowledge, and are free to believe and act as they choose. Thus, they can either accept or refuse the arguments of the persuader. Contrarily, manipulated interlocutors have a more passive role, and they do not have sufficient information to resist manipulation, thus they generally become victims of it. Therefore, manipulation is negatively stigmatised, whereas persuasion is a socially accepted and promoted action in societies. For the differences between manipulation and legitimate persuasion, see Table 1 below.

Manipulation	Persuasion
Illegitimate influence, negative stigma	Legitimate influence, socially accepted
The truth is distorted to make the interlocutors change opinion	True argument is used to make the interlocutors change their opinion
Abuse of power	No use of power
The interlocutors are deceived	The interlocutors are presented with and perhaps convinced by reasonable arguments
It serves the best interest of the manipulator	It serves a clear purpose

Table 1. Differences between manipulation and legitimate persuasion

Van Dijk stresses that in the case of manipulation, “the crucial criteria are that people are being acted upon against their fully conscious will and interests, and that manipulation is in the best interests of the manipulator” (2006, p. 361). He adds that the recipients may be more or less manipulatable in different circumstances, and in some cases even ethically legitimate persuasion may be manipulative.

1.1.2 Approaches to the linguistic analysis of political discourse

This section reviews two important methodologies which provide the starting points in the creation of the PIMI instrument. From the wide range of CDA methods, Chilton and Schäffner’s (1997) bottom-up and van Dijk’s (2006) top-down analytical models have been selected for the purposes of the present research, as they are sufficiently complex and informative, and were created for the analysis of political speeches. The systematic comparison of these two models, by performing analyses of a selected political speech, has yielded sufficient data for the evaluation of the theoretical and empirical merits and drawbacks of both models.

1.1.2.1 Chilton and Schäffner’s bottom-up method

Chilton and Schäffner’s (1997) method builds up the process of the analysis in a meticulous way, from the bottom to the top, firstly identifying the fundamental linguistic phenomena and then reaching the complex conclusions, step by step. As it is displayed in Figure 1, Chilton and Schäffner link strategic functions to a linguistic analysis of the text. The overlap between the two circles signifies the linkage between strategic functions and their linguistic realizations.




Figure 1. Strategic functions and the linguistic analysis of the text (based on Chilton & Schäffner, 1997)

The main strategic functions in political speeches are coercion, resistance, dissimulation and legitimization/de-legitimization (Table 2). The strategic functions are discussed in line with a linguistic analysis of the text, in which Chilton and Schäffner refer to pragmatics regarding speech acts, semantics and syntax.

Coercion	speech acts backed by sanctions: commands, requests
Legitimization/delegitimization	positive self-presentation/ negative other-presentation
Dissimulation	control of information: lying, blurring, defocusing
Resistance, opposition	samizdat, graffiti

Table 2. The strategic functions (based on Chilton & Schäffner, 1997)

Chilton and Schäffner (1997) claim that languages are built of discourses and meanings which are related in various ways, therefore the nouns, verbs and adjectives and their various syntactic combinations are analysed and interpreted in a profound way. They emphasize that by examining semantics, where the focus is on the layer of words and meanings, much may be learnt about the intention of the speaker. Since the opinion-related connotations of a word might differ greatly from its original denotation, politicians can express their opinion by using certain connotations in order to carry out their political objectives (Hunston & Thompson, 1999). At the level of syntax, agency and focus are the most relevant notions. By examining syntax, it is possible to detect concepts and communicative functions that are difficult to recognize at the first reading of a text. Chilton and Schäffner underline that an event may be syntactically encoded in special ways in accordance with the purpose of the speaker, which can enable the receiver to decode what the actual message is. All of the above mentioned positionings, word order, intonation and stress, together with pragmatic, semantic and syntactic tools, enable orators to achieve what they want through powerful political speeches (Table 3).

Pragmatics	Language as interaction ¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • representatives (truth claims) • directives (commands, requests) • commissives (promises, threats)
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¹ Interaction refers to verbal meaning-making as a social practice, in this paper.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • declaratives (proclamations, announcements) • expressives (attitudes, judgements)
Semantics	Meanings, structure of lexicon	nouns, verbs, adjectives: synonyms, antonyms, metaphors
Syntax	The internal organization of sentences	agency, focus, thematic roles, agent, patient, location, transitivity

Table 3. The linguistic levels of analysis (based on Chilton & Schäffner, 1997)

Chilton and Schäffner's inductive method focuses on specific observations of the individual elements of the whole system step-by-step, from the beginning to the end of the analysis. Therefore, this analysis does not reveal manifest results immediately, as it only gradually reaches completeness. Despite the drawbacks of the seemingly isolated steps during the analysis, a merit of the bottom-up method is the lack of predefined categories and thus it is of an open-ended nature, which allows more freedom of interpretation.

1.1.2.2 Van Dijk's top-down method²

Van Dijk (2006) explores the properties of political manipulation within his triangulated approach linking discourse, cognition and society. This approach regards manipulation as a form of social power abuse, cognitive mind control and discursive interaction. According to van Dijk (2006, p. 372), manipulation takes place in a broad sense at the discursive level, including non-verbal characteristics such as gestures, pictures, sound, music and other social or cultural features. Moreover, he highlights that manipulation is a social practice of power abuse. Thus the 'same' discourse may be manipulative in one situation but not in another. He concludes that discourse may be defined as manipulative primarily in terms of the context models of the participants. Consequently, discourse structures are not manipulative by definition; however, they may be more efficient in certain contexts than in others – such as, argues van Dijk, in the process of influencing the minds of recipients. Figure 2 shows the interconnectedness of discourse, cognition and society in the processes of manipulation.




Figure 2. Van Dijk's triangulated approach to manipulation

Despite his concerns regarding the feasibility of capturing the linguistic signs of manipulation, van Dijk attempts to provide a detailed framework for the identification of manipulation in political speeches. He inspects overall interaction strategies, macro speech acts, semantic macrostructures, local speech acts and meanings, the lexicon, local syntax, and the

² Van Dijk considers the discourse-cognition-society triangle in the process of manipulation. However, due to space limits, the psychological aspects of the framework are not discussed in this paper.

rhetorical figures such as hyperboles or metonymies and metaphors. His analytical tool provides predefined criteria for the analysis, starting with the more general ideas, leading to the more specific. He highlights the ideological polarization between “Us” and “Them”, scrutinizing various strategies, semantic and syntactic aspects and different speech acts in texts. His top-down method narrows down the focus from the general to the particular, presenting several manipulative moves in the discourse. Van Dijk’s top-down method is represented by an inverted pyramid in Figure 3.




Figure 3. The visual representation of Van Dijk’s (2006) top-down method

Van Dijk’s deductive approach operates from general information to the specific. The analysis begins with macro-levels through an overview of the ‘overall interaction strategies’, including the examination of the context. This top-down method pre-defines the categories, and each layer of the analysis is refined in greater detail heading towards local levels. As the categories are ready-made, the method allows less space for free explanation. Due to the ready-made categories of the deductive method, the application of the method can result in losing important data. In addition, without sufficient knowledge concerning the context, the application of the top-down method can easily distort the results of the analysis. Despite its weaknesses, van Dijk’s model is fairly dynamic, providing results quickly at the beginning of the analysis.

1.2 Research questions

In view of the results of previous research and the goals of the inquiry, the following

theoretical and empirical questions guide the current research:

- 1) Which features of power, ideology and manipulation can be identified in Tony Blair's speech on the war against Iraq (2003) by using the *Power, Ideology and Manipulation Identification* instrument as an analytical tool?
- 2) What kind of relationship can be identified between the concepts of power, ideology and manipulation in Tony Blair's speech on the war against Iraq (2003)?
- 3) What conclusions may be drawn regarding the reliability and validity of the *Power, Ideology and Manipulation Identification* instrument as an analytical tool?

2 Method

In order to answer the research questions, a set of research methods had to be selected. The following sections provide a detailed description of how the different steps of the analysis conducted by the PIMI instrument were applied to demonstrate features of context, power, ideology and manipulation in Tony Blair's speech on Iraq (Blair, 2003), henceforth referred to as Blair's speech. Firstly, the reasons for the selection of Blair's speech are explained, and then the different parts of the newly designed analytical instrument are introduced.

2.1 The text submitted to analysis

Since there is no "CDA way of gathering data" (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 27), some researchers examine large corpora of texts, others focus on some or only one particular text. Sampling is strongly bound within the theory and the questions of the given piece of research. However, most CDA studies use texts which denote a special social problem which the researcher wants to investigate. This research is concerned with finding the characteristic signs of power, ideology and manipulation; therefore only one 'special' text is used, which is a typical text, characterized by massive uses of power, ideological bias and manipulation. As for the genre of the text, political speeches appear to be the most useful for the purpose of the present study. Firstly, this is due to the fact that political speeches are delivered by political actors who directly take part in organizational decision making and social power abuse (van Dijk, 2006). Secondly, political speeches are premeditated therefore much less spontaneous than, for example, political debates. Consequently they may contain various, intentionally-used elements of power, ideologies and manipulation.

The present text is a notable manipulative speech of former UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair. It was made in the British Parliament, in the House of Commons, on 18th March, 2003. In the speech, Blair legitimated his government's decision to go to war and invade Iraq. The speech in question has been explored by several authors (Chartesis-Black, 2014; Hamilton, 2012; van Dijk, 2006), since it implies apparent signs of discursive power abuse. Van Dijk partially analyses and interprets the text in his study (2006, p. 377) and the present research also uses this text for all aspects of the analysis. According to van Dijk (2006), this case is important, because until the following general elections in Britain, Blair was accused of having misled UK citizens about his decision (van Dijk, 2006, p. 376). Another major reason for the selection of the speech is due to the access to a part of it on the YouTube video portal in a visual form, as this way this section of the speech can be later submitted to a multimodal discourse analysis (MDA) of the speaker's gestures, mime and intonation, in order to gain a broader picture with more information. For the full text of the speech see the Appendix.

2.2 The instrument

The in-depth analysis of power, ideologies and manipulation in Blair's speech has been conducted by the newly designed PIMI analytical instrument. The instrument combines the steps of the bottom-up (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997), and the top-down (van Dijk, 2006) methods, emphasizing the 'Us/Them' distinction throughout the systematic analysis of several linguistic levels. Figure 4 shows the interconnectedness of the three examined concepts, and the two-way arrows represent the combination of the top-down and the bottom-up approaches during the analysis.




Figure 4. The combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches in the analysis

The new analytical instrument also draws on other relevant theories and research (Carver & Hyvärinen, 1997; Fowler, 1985; Hoey, 2001; Kress, 1985; Pang & Lee, 2008; van Dijk, 1998; Weiss & Wodak, 2003; Wodak, 2007, 2011). The instrument has been built up of independent, self-contained levels, where all levels can be treated separately, and can also be combined. Figure 5 illustrates the progression of sequential steps in the analysis. The figure emphasizes the movement and the suggested direction of the process.




Figure 5. The basic structural process of the linguistic analysis done by the PIMI analytical instrument – The arrow signals the suggested direction of the process.

Fairclough and Wodak (1997) warn that it is crucial to observe how texts are interpreted and what social effects they have. The cultural, social and political background of the speech provides data which promotes the interpretation of the linguistic characteristics of the text. Therefore, a prerequisite for examining the features of power, ideologies and manipulation in political discourse must be an intensive exploration of the context (Hoey, 2001; Moir, 2013; van Dijk, 2006; Weiss & Wodak, 2003; Wodak, 2007). Van Dijk (2001) and Weiss and Wodak (2003) stress that the topic belongs to the contextual layer, thus the topic pattern of the speech is considered to be part of the context in the new analytical instrument.

The analysis goes along with examining the linguistic level of pragmatics, by covering speech acts. According to Searle (1976, 1979), just by saying something, speakers simultaneously achieve things. Searle distinguishes five illocutionary points which can be achieved by speakers: representatives, commissives, directives, declaratives, and expressives. By using representatives, speakers can claim how things are in the world. With directives speakers attempt to get listeners to do something. The successful performance of declaratives brings alternation in the status or condition of the referred things, exactly at the moment of the utterance. Commissives commit the speaker to do something, and expressives convey the speaker's feelings or attitudes about themselves and the world. Over time, Searle's five speech act categories have been researched, improved and further specified (Bach & Harnish, 1979; Clark, 1996; Guiraud et al., 2011; Norrick, 1978; Vandeviken 1990). The present research uses Searle's original five categories supplemented with their further modifications. The speech act categories, their descriptions and illocutionary acts can be seen in Table 4.

Speech act category	Description	Illocutionary acts
Representatives	<p>The expressed proposition reveals</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • how things are in the world • the speaker's beliefs • how "the speakers fit words to the world" (Searle, 1979) 	assertions, suggesting, putting forward, diagnoses, swearing, notifications, concluding, predicting, confessing, denying, praising, blaming (Clark, 1996)
Directives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • attempts by the speaker to get hearers to do something • how "the speakers fit the world to the words" (Searle, 1979) 	asking, ordering, requesting, advising, begging (Clark, 1996)
Declaratives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • how the speaker brings a state of affairs into existence by declaring it to exist • that "declaratives bring about some alternation in the status or condition of the referred object" (Searle, 1979) 	announcements, proclamations, assessing, certifying, grading, ranking, ruling (Bach & Harnish, 1979)
Commissives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the commitment of the speaker to some future course of action • how to "fit the world to the words" (Searle, 1979) 	promising, planning, vowing, betting, opposing
Expressives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the speaker's feelings, attitudes, positive or negative evaluations about the world • that the speaker is neither trying to get the world to match the words nor the words to match the world (Searle, 1979) 	agreement, disagreement, offering thanks, condoling, deploring, apologizing, forgiving, congratulating, exclamations, boasts, accusing, expressions of sorrow, greetings and moral satisfaction, admiration (Clark, 1996; Guiraud et al., 2011; Norrick, 1978; Vanderveken, 1990)

Table 4. The five speech act categories, their descriptions, and illocutionary acts (Clark, 1996; Guiraud et al., 2011; Norrick, 1978; Searle, 1976, 1979; Vanderveken, 1990)

Each speech act is to be considered in the case of all examined constructs, though the emphases, functions and interpretations might be distinct. The PIMI instrument attempts to identify characteristic ways in which speech acts either contribute to the formation of ideologies, or overt coercion and more hidden manipulative utterances are expressed. The next level of linguistic examination deals with semantics and lexis. The choice of nouns, verbs, adjectives; their meanings and frequencies³ may reveal important details about the speakers' worldview, their intentions and manipulative strategies. The level of syntax is the most latent element in text and talk, and therefore it is the most difficult to make its functions and effects visible. Nevertheless, the scrutiny of syntactic structures might bring the conceptual world constructed in the text to conscious consideration (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997, p. 226). By moving to deeper levels, the analysis reveals more significant information, and consequently becomes more profound. The synthesis of the levels could provide comprehensive knowledge regarding various features of power, ideology and manipulation in political discourse.

³ The on-line software used for the analysis of word frequencies is 'Text Analyzer' available at: <https://www.online-utility.org/text/analyzer.jsp>.

As the analysis of each level may provide complete data, all examined levels can be discussed independently. The concepts of power, ideology and manipulation might be examined through the lenses of the linguistic levels of pragmatics, semantics and lexis, and syntax. Conversely, each linguistic level might be explored consecutively from the angle of power, ideology and manipulation. As the main focus of this study is on the manifestation of power, ideology and manipulation, the linguistic analysis is carried out from the angle of these concepts. The following sections provide a detailed description of how the main concepts can be examined by using the PIMI instrument.

2.2.1 Context

Van Dijk (2001, p. 108) argues that “the critical aims of CDA can only be realized if discourse structures are related to structures of local and global contexts”. He adds that whilst there are many theories of text and talk, there is no real theory of context. Nevertheless, van Dijk considers the social properties of communicative events relevant, and he suggests that society may also be analysed at the level of interaction and situations and at the level of groups, social organizations and institutions (2001, p. 115). It must be noted that political speeches may seem unidirectional, but in fact, the speaker delivers a political message to an audience. Therefore the audience is part of an interactive turn-taking process (Moir, 2013, p. 230). Hoey (2001) also claims that the text itself is the site for the interaction between the speaker and the audience, so the audience of the text co-operates with the speaker in making common meaning. Therefore certain background knowledge on behalf of the audience is often needed to construct the common meaning.

2.2.1.1 The levels of context

Weiss and Wodak (2003, p. 22) mention that “on the one hand the situational, institutional and social settings shape and affect discourses, and, on the other, discourses influence discursive as well as non-discursive social and political processes and actions”. Weiss and Wodak⁴ (2003, p. 22) highlight that to avoid “simply politicizing, instead of accurately analysing,” it is necessary to work on the basis of a variety of different empirical data and background information. On the basis of Weiss and Wodak’s (2003) ideas, the PIMI model focuses on four different types of contextual information:

- 1) the immediate language or text
- 2) the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between discourses
- 3) the extra-linguistic social variables
- 4) the broader socio-political and historical contexts, which the discourses are embedded in and related to.

The data could consist of related texts, images, music, video recordings and various other written or visual sources. Moreover, the different layers of the context constitute a ‘network’, and the analyst himself is part of this network (White, 1992). The analyst’s choices regarding the contextual information reflect not purely the issue under investigation but his subjective viewpoint. Thus, the overall analysis entails a thorough investigation of the various contextual layers, including the analyst’s self-reflection (Figure 6).

⁴ Weiss and Wodak (2003) refer to the context definition of Discourse Historical Approach (DHA).




Figure 6. Variables of contextual information

2.2.1.2 Objectivity versus inter-subjectivity

A major question regarding the collection of contextual information is whether an objective viewpoint can be achieved. According to Neuendorf (2003), an important aim of any systematic investigation is to provide an objective description or explanation of a phenomenon without biases of the investigator. However, she adds, there is no such thing as true objectivity, since knowledge and facts are phenomena based on social consensus. Therefore all human inquiry is subjective, though the consistency among these inquiries should be ensured. Instead of asking if something is true we should ask if we agree that it is true. Based on these ideas, Neuendorf (2003, p. 11) argues that instead of struggling for objectivity, individual interpretations should take place. Hence, it does not seem to be reasonable to seek objectivity, as contextual information implies conclusions that are unique, non-generalizable, rich and well grounded.

2.2.1.3 The topic pattern

Several attempts have been made to define the aspects which influence the topic structure of a text. McCarthy (1991, p. 78) claims that by identifying the topic of a speech, the gist of the text is disclosed. In order to identify the gist, the reader has to explore larger textual patterns of the text. According to McCarthy, it is worth beginning to see how important certain vocabulary items are in the discourse, since patterns in text are generated by vocabulary relations. Goutsos (1997, p. 156) adds that schematic structure, genre, choice of subject matter may all influence relations and strategies in the text. As mentioned, Hoey (2001) and Moir (2013) claim that every discourse can be seen as a kind of social interaction between the producer and the receiver. Hoey⁵ (2001, p. 13) adds that this interaction always has a purpose, for example, political texts always aim to persuade the audience, though the purpose of the speaker and the audience do not necessarily match. Hoey emphasizes that political texts are basically problem-solution type texts, since they typically raise a problem which must be solved. He suggests a problem-solution pattern, projecting the text into a dialogue in a way that the questions highlight the relationship between the sentences. The questions which have to be asked are:

⁵ Hoey (2001) mainly focuses on written discourse, however, he extends his theory to speech as well.

- What problem arose for you?
- What did you do about this?
- What was the result?

The answers to the questions of the problem-solution pattern define four stages (Figure 7).



Figure 7. Hoey’s problem-solution pattern

Hoey (2001, p. 124) claims that “in authentic text the answers to the questions may vary greatly in length.” Therefore this research proposes the application of the model to identify the *situation*, the *problem*, the *response* and the *positive result* for the surface structure of the speech. This implies bigger units than mere sentences or paragraphs.

2.2.2 Power

2.2.2.1 Pragmatics

As Dahl remarks, “operational equivalents of the formal definition, designed to meet the needs of a particular research problem, are likely to diverge from one another in important ways” (1957, p. 202). In the present study, power is defined both in a broad and a narrow sense, though the narrow sense definition is the basis of the interpretations. In a narrow sense, power as a type of control might be captured in the processes of coercion.

Directives are the most power-dependent and the most obvious linguistic realization of the coercion function (Chilton & Schäffner 1997, p. 219). Declaratives also convey power, since only powerful speakers are in the position to make announcements which influence the lives of others. Table 5 displays the most apparent power-dependent pragmatic features in political speeches.

Power: Coercion	
Directives	begs, requests, commands
Declaratives	announcements, proclamations

Table 5. Explicit signs of power in political texts at the level of pragmatics

In a broad sense, any type of asymmetrical relationship might be considered as one where power is present. Therefore power can also be traced by examining the use of representatives, expressives and commissives (for more details see Table 6).

Power: Inequality	
Representatives	assertions, truth claims: owner of the information, omnipotent character
Expressives	positive self / negative other presentation
Commissives	promises, threats

Table 6. Implicit signs of power in political texts, at the level of pragmatics

Since coercion overtly makes the addressee perform an action, the present analysis treats coercion as the explicit manifestation of power. It is important to note that in case of coercion, the presence of authority is necessary. Whereas, the implicit signs of power are more hidden, and they do not cause immediate action, rather they make changes in the recipients' minds. These forms of implicit power are considered to take part rather in the more covert processes of manipulation in the present study (for details see 2.2.4.1).

2.2.2.2 Semantics and lexis

Semantic analyses primarily focus on the content of the speech, attempting to make valid inferences from it. According to the results of previous pilot analyses, coercion cannot be fully derivable from the meanings of the parts that it is composed of. In other words, power as coercion is not likely to be traced only by examining the lexical choices and meanings in a text, since lexical meaning is modulated in context. Syntactic structures, contexts, lexical preferences, and meanings together create coercive utterances (Pustejovsky & Jezek, 2008). Therefore, power as a coercive force might be interpreted rather as a combination of semantics and syntax. However, power in a broad sense, when contributing to the formation of unequal relations and manipulation, can be examined at the semantic level too (for details see 2.2.4.2).

2.2.2.3 Syntax

Power can be explored at the syntactic level of the analysis, in several ways. First of all, the predominance of agent-action structures may signal a world of controlled activity (Fowler, 1985). The speaker might express coercion by using imperatives or active voice when he is in a subject position. Aside from the important role of agency, modal verbs also contribute to conveying significant information in political discourse. Modal verbs might often transmit meanings related to power. The modal verbs '*may, shall, must, need, should...*' are often used coercively by the speakers since there is a strong connection of the meanings of obligation and permission with power. Some of the characteristic signs of power at the pragmatic and syntactic levels are listed in Table 7.

Power (coercion)	
Pragmatics	- Directives: goals of the speaker, obligations of the audience - Declaratives: regulations, rules
Semantics and lexis	- unable to fully explain coercion - lexical meaning is modified by syntax and context
Syntax	- Imperatives, agent-action structures, modals (need, must, have to, shall, should)

Table 7. Power as a coercive force

2.2.3 Ideology

2.2.3.1 Pragmatics

Ideologies are considered as the basic representations of social groups (van Dijk, 2001, p. 115) in this paper. According to van Dijk (2001), ideologies are at the basis of the knowledge and attitudes of groups, and they have a schematic structure that represents the self-image of each

group. Ideologies feature membership devices, aims, activities, norms and resources of each group, and convey the basic principles that organize the group members' attitudes.

Based on the experience gained by the previous pilot analyses, ideologies seem to unfurl partly in the form of representatives, as assertions. Assertions are simple statements or truth claims, which represent the speaker's beliefs. Political actors speak safely in the knowledge that their beliefs are true or at least seem to be true for the audience. Yet, these beliefs are not necessarily accurate. In many cases they are rather biased propositions, bald assertions, boasts, or over-general claims. Other acts might appear in the form of expressives, which convey the speaker's emotions and unique standpoint about reality. Ideological polarization by the legitimization of 'Our' good acts and the delegitimization of 'Their' bad acts are common features of political discourse. Directives, commissives and declaratives reveal information about the speaker's beliefs regarding his own, and his audience's duties, as well about the desired future directions. Table 8 shows the pragmatic features of ideologies in political texts.

Ideology → The speaker's beliefs (bias)	
Representatives	Praising, blaming, over-general claims, bald assertions, facts
Expressives	Legitimization → 'Our good acts' / Delegitimization → 'Their bad acts'
Directives	Goals
Commissives	Desires and fears
Declaratives	Rules defined by the speaker, beneficial future directions

Table 8. Signs of ideologies in political texts at the level of pragmatics

2.2.3.2 Semantics and lexis

Vocabulary can be considered a kind of lexical map of the preoccupations of a speaker. Whatever is important for a speaker is richly lexicalized (Fowler 1985, p. 65). Relevant topics and ideological principles might be detected by scrutinizing the patterns of semantic choices in the text. By focusing on certain topics and iterating certain words, or by using some words more often than others, the speaker can signal the importance of these topics. The frequency of using particular words or synonyms can assign the rate of importance. Besides the semantic choices, for instance the use of antonyms, the speaker might create opposition and draw boundaries, giving rise to ideologically biased utterances. Metaphors can also be useful devices to communicate conceptualizations of reality which enable speakers to avoid direct face-threatening references.

2.2.3.3 Syntax

Speakers might place important notions in subject positions, underlining general norms, values and ideological principles. The foci of the sentences reveal the ideologically significant topics in the text. Passive voice allows a different ordering of participant nouns than active, and the focus of the topics change. By the application of nominalizations or passive constructions, the subject might be emphasized. In contrast, the repeated usage of passive structures to hide agents occurs in an attempt to conceal vital information. Ideological discourse usually applies the "Us/Them" distinction de-emphasizing "Our" agency in negative acts, and emphasizing it in positive acts. Passives and nominalizations seem to be frequent in political language that practices an ideology of impersonality.

Modality may also indicate the speakers' attitudes to the propositions they utter. In some cases the validity of these attitudes is questionable, especially in strongly ideological speeches.

Most importantly, the modal auxiliary verbs *may*, *shall*, *must* and *need* might express the speaker's attitudes and beliefs. Sentence adverbs such as *probably*, *certainly*, *regrettably*, adjectives such as *necessary*, *unfortunate*, *certain*, and some verbs, *permit*, *predict*, *prove*, etc., can also have meanings of modality. Predictability, desirability, validity, obligation, permission can all be emphasized by the use of these modal verbs. For the characteristic signs of ideology, see Table 9.

Ideology (beliefs)	
Pragmatics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Representatives: self-serving constructions, truth and falsity - Expressives: bias, US/THEM, emotionally loaded - Commissives: promises – desires, threats – fears - Directives: goals - Declaratives: rules, values, norms
Semantics and lexis	- Patterns of lexical choices, iterations, prominence, importance, relevance, implication, coherence, levels of description
Syntax	- Focus – ideologically significant topics in focal position, US/THEM distinction, modals (necessity, probability: <i>may</i> , <i>shall</i> , <i>need</i>), sentence adverbs: <i>probably</i> , <i>certainly</i> , <i>regrettably</i> ...

Table 9. Signs of ideologies in political texts

2.2.4 Manipulation

2.2.4.1 Pragmatics

Manipulation is taken to be a kind of power abuse and illegitimate influence in the frames of this study. As mentioned earlier, the aim of the manipulator is to make the audience believe or act in a way that serves the best interests of the manipulator (van Dijk, 2006). Power and manipulation seem to be overlapping in many respects, thus the present study intends to make clear distinctions between them. Power is associated with coercive force, which is overtly used to get somebody to do something. In manipulative processes, the audience is not influenced overtly, rather in disguised ways, in accord with the speaker's intentions. Thus, manipulation is treated here as hidden influence by unfair control. For the differences between power and manipulation, see Table 10.

Power	Manipulation
Authority's force causes changes in other people's behaviour	No overt force, but hidden ability to make changes in other people's behaviour
Entails force; people obey the commands of someone who is stronger	People act on the basis of their own beliefs
It does not contain emotions; only the presence of the authority causes action	Manipulated people act against their best interest based on the basis of their own beliefs, even without the presence of an authority
Positional; connected to high position	Personal; high position is not necessary, rather personal traits
It forces people to do things	It changes people's beliefs
It is imposed by authoritative figures	It does not necessarily require authority, rather emotions

Table 10. Differences between power and manipulation

According to this approach, manipulation does not happen through the speaker's direct orders, begs, or announcements. Rather, politicians try to change the way listeners respond to their political messages. Therefore, the manipulative effect of political messages seems to depend on whether a message appeals to the listeners' emotions, especially their enthusiasm or fear. Emotional appeals also require rational 'facts' to justify the choices and increase the emotional response of recipients (Brader, 2006)⁶. Based on this, manipulative utterances might be best expressed by a type of language which can cause changes in the recipients' minds. Representatives, expressives, and commissives do not force the audience openly, rather they may influence the audience's mind-set in hidden ways. A common manipulative strategy in political talk is dissimulation, most commonly expressed by representatives. Lying, defocusing, or blurring the information are well-known tricks of manipulative speakers. Moreover, representatives might influence the recipients' views in more subtle ways. The politician is in a privileged status regarding his access to information. By his assertions, he takes the role of an omnipotent character, the knower of the information, the seer of the future, who has an influential position. This superior position might even be escalated further by the use of expressive speech acts. Expressives convey the speaker's attitude or emotions towards an idea. By constraining the conflicting meanings of the actions of 'Us' and 'Them', the speaker may further expand the inequality between himself and others, in this way increasing his own influence. Manipulation might also happen by using commissives. Commissives, in the forms of fake promises or ungrounded threats, can be efficient manipulative devices. In this way they are able to manufacture consent by abusing the recipients' emotional vulnerability; their fears and desires. Since usually no evidence is given, the hearers cannot check the truth value of the speaker's expressives, representatives, and commissives. Consequently, the flouting of the Gricean maxims of quality and quantity are recurrent fallacies. The main pragmatic manifestations of manipulation can be seen in Table 11.

Manipulation	
Representatives	Fact or opinion / Dissimulation: lying, blurring, defocusing / Omnipotent speaker
Expressives	Emotional utterances, Polarization: 'Their bad acts' / 'Our good acts'
Commissives	Dissimulation: fake promises, irrational threats – manufacturing consent or fear

Table 11. Signs of manipulation in political texts at the level of pragmatics

As for the lies, it is often difficult for the analyst to decide if the speaker is aware of the fact that his propositions flout the Gricean maxims, since only the speaker knows if he is lying (Bolinger, 1980). As Meibauer (2007, p. 80) argues, "...lies display no special devices that indicate illocutionary force." A possible solution for the problem of identifying lies is offered by Urchs (2007, p. 43), who stresses "the role of background knowledge". Urchs adds that "it may be the poverty of knowledge that makes you fall victim to liars" (2007, p. 43). Therefore, in the process of deciding if something is a lie or not, context is crucial. Consequently, knowledge about context might take on a pivotal role in the examination of manipulation.

⁶ Brader (2006) focuses on the role of emotional appeals in political ads, however he remarks that the nature of impact should be the same for emotions evoked by ads, speeches, news coverage, debates, or direct mailings.

2.2.4.2 Semantics and lexis

Manipulation at the semantic level can be best revealed by polarization, and biased utterances. Generally, the lexical choices referring to ‘Us’ represent positive content, while referring to ‘Them’ conveys negative content. The lexicalization of a text; the polarization at the level of nouns, verbs and adjectives, metaphors, hyperboles and euphemisms encode differences between the classes of participants. Abstract nouns signal more formal categories with more prestige. Dynamic verbs, especially in the active form, mediate agent controlled actions. Potent actors in the political world are possessors of knowledge, dynamism and good qualities. Therefore, the semantic structure of a text might indicate the role of the speaker as an oracular, the guardian of truth, and the creator of good things (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997, p. 220). In contrast, the words might downplay the opposition’s actual potency (Kress, 1985, p. 38). These dichotomies could be traced at the level of nouns, verbs and adjectives:

Nouns: abstract ↔ concrete
 Verbs: dynamic ↔ stative
 Adjectives: positive ↔ negative

The meanings of nouns, verbs and adjectives might underscore the distinctive position of the speaker. For example, by using antonyms, the speaker can make great distinctions between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, enhancing the difference between ‘Our’ good qualities and ‘Their’ bad qualities (van Dijk, 2006). This systematic semantic dissymmetry might increase the influence of the speaker.

2.2.4.3 Syntax

According to van Dijk (1996), no basic linguistic structures of manipulation have yet been found. Nevertheless, polarization at the syntactic level seems to be able to form manipulative structures in political discourse. Therefore, certain syntactic organizations could well assist the politician to assign how people feel or how they should act. Syntactic choices enable the speaker to stress dynamism. Active voice indicates the dynamism, responsibility and capability of ‘Us’. On the contrary, passive voice could denote a kind of inability of ‘Them’. When the opponents are in the subject position, the speaker might use passive constructions to imply their inability. This contrast increases the power of the speaker showing him as an active, competent character whilst his opponent is placed in a passive, submissive position (Figure 8).




Figure 8. Syntactic polarization

Passive structures help the speaker blur responsibility when speaking about ‘Us’. When verbs appear in passive voice, it permits agent-deletion, but not the deletion of modality, therefore only the cause of an event is blurred. Nominalizations are also helpful devices to disguise the agent, so the speaker can obscure responsibility when speaking about displeasing themes. Nominalizations are perfect tools for the speaker to claim credit, in this case self-legitimization is combined with dissimulation. With these tools the manipulative polarization of ‘Our’ acts and ‘Their’ acts can be efficiently administered by the speaker. For the signs of manipulation, see Table 12.

Manipulation	
Pragmatics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Representatives: deception, lies, omnipotent speaker, knower of information - Expressives: employing emotional vulnerability, polarization - Commissives: pressuring, playing with the audience’s desires and fears by imposing promises or threats
Semantics and lexis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inequality – verbs (active/stative), nouns (abstract/concrete), adjectives (positive/negative)
Syntax	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Agency, Active/Passive constructions (responsibility, potency, control, powerless/powerful position), nominalization (blurring responsibility), focus

Table 12. Signs of manipulation in political texts

3 Results and discussion

3.1 The context

Following Weiss and Wodak’s (2003) ideas, contextual information has an important role in the analysis. However, due to space limitations, the context is only briefly outlined here, though contextual information is infinite. The list of variables is presented in Table 13.

Extra linguistic social variable	<p>The speaker: Tony Blair, Labour party leader, Prime Minister of Britain 1997-2007; after the invasion of Iraq, Blair was given the nickname ‘Bliar’ and ‘Prime Monster’; Blair resigned as Prime Minister on 27th June 2007.</p> <p>The audience: the House of Commons; the people of Britain; the people of the international community</p> <p>The effects of the speech: Iraq war 19th March 2003; riots in Britain; music: Muse; film: Fair Game 2010; conflicts in the Middle-East, international terrorism, ISIS</p>
Broader socio-political context	The international political environment: G. W. Bush; UN; Europe
Intertextual relationship	<p>Lyrics: Muse’s song, <i>Take a bow (2006)</i>⁷ “promises a fiery doom for the architects of the Iraq war” (Lynskey, 2007)</p> <p>News articles: published as an immediate critical response to Blair’s speech → <i>The Independent</i> (Blair tells MPs, 2003); <i>The New York Times</i> (Hodge, 2003)</p>
The position of the analyst who is part of the contextual ‘network’	<p>The analyst’s subjective opinion about the issue</p> <p>The analyst’s general attitude regarding the speaker</p>
Immediate text	<p>Date: 18th March 2003; location: The British Parliament, The House of Commons</p> <p>Written version of the speech, numbered sentences (see the Appendix), and the speech on <i>You Tube</i>⁸</p> <p>Topic pattern (Hoey, 2001) :</p> <p>Situation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The house of commons is asked to pass judgement and attack Iraq, since Iraq has Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) • lines 1-17 <p>Problem:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iraq's arsenal of WMD is a threat/ The cruelty of Saddam's regime causes suffering to Iraq's people • lines 18-23 <p>Response:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inspectors probed. • Iraq was forced to comply with the inspectors. • Saddam is playing the same old game, he hides WMD. • lines 24-268 <p>Positive result:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Britain should confront the tyrannies dictatorships and terrorists • lines 269-326

Table 13. Contextual variables related to Blair’s (2003) speech

⁷ The source of the music video: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQXit0vly2I> retrieved December 21, 2017.

The source of the lyrics: <http://www.metrolyrics.com/take-a-bow-lyrics-muse.html> retrieved December 21, 2017.

⁸ The source of the video containing a section from Tony Blair’s speech, made on the 18th March, 2003: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HPCTBXse80c>

3.2 Power

The analysis of the *pragmatic level* entails the detailed scrutiny of the speech acts. The speech consists of 326 sentences. To ensure the conduct of a meticulous analysis, all the sentences, one after another, were examined and classified according to their speech act category. Although a sentence is a well definable grammatical unit, it does not always contain one type of speech act only. Therefore, in the case of complex sentences, where the clauses comprised distinct illocutions, the clauses were evaluated separately. Besides this, some utterances could not be related to any speech act categories, hence they were left out. Since the examined sentences or clauses generally cannot be isolated from context, the communicative function of each speech act was considered by relating it to its context constituents. Altogether 282 utterances were categorized, as a certain number of utterances could not be related to any speech acts. The majority of the speech acts, approximately 80 per cent, are representatives, signalling that the speaker places emphasis on sharing information. However, a major part of Blair's representatives are not true facts, rather they are subjective judgements. A smaller part, approximately 10 per cent of the speech acts are directives. Emotionally loaded expressives are rarely presented in the speech; there are even fewer commissives, and no declaratives at all. Figure 9 shows the division of speech acts in Blair's speech.




Figure 9. The distribution of speech acts in Blair's (2003) speech

Blair overtly displays his power through his coercive acts. By way of his requests, suggestions and advice, he urges his audience to act: (1; 326)⁹ *I beg to move the motion...*; (7) *...we must demand he disarm...*; (136) *The world has to learn the lesson...*; (226) *...the world should unite...*; (156) *... this indulgence has to stop...*; (277) *...We have to act within the terms set out in resolution 1441...*; (299) *...we must face the consequences...*; (324) *...This is not the time to falter...* By these directives, the audience is pushed to accept Blair's arguments to act. There are no declaratives in the text, signalling that the speaker does not take the responsibility to make decisions about the issue independently. Rather, Blair intends to make his audience come to a resolution. The lack of declaratives, the relatively small number of directives, and the great number of representatives suggest that the speaker restricts his own role to inform the recipients about the danger caused by Hussein, and to advise them to act.

⁹ The numbers in brackets indicate the line numbers in the text of the speech. The full text of the speech can be seen in the Appendix.

At the *syntactic level*, coercive force is strongly signalled by the modality in the speech. There is a notable predominance of the use of the modal verbs *should*, *have to* and *must*. They appear many times throughout the speech, mainly when Blair speaks about the responsibility of the House to control Hussein's actions: (3) ... *we must hold firm ... (116) ... we must demand ... (152) ... our patience should have been exhausted, we should have acted ... (277) ... we have to act ... (299) ... we must face the consequences ...* The connection of the modal verbs of obligation with power is spectacular; Blair employs his power by using these devices to order or advise the House of Commons.

3.3 Ideology

At the *pragmatic level*, ideologies mostly unfurl through various representatives. The division of the speech acts indicates that Blair primarily relies on spreading information via his representatives, by several propositions connected to the issue. Truth claims might represent Blair's beliefs, although these beliefs are not necessarily accurate in each case. It can be inferred that the concept of representatives used by Searle (1976, 1979) blurs the distinction between fact and subjective judgement. Therefore, when examining representatives, a differentiation between true facts and opinion seems to be necessary. A major part of Blair's representatives convey opinion instead of fact. Blair shares his evaluations several times: (3) ... *That is the democracy that is our right but that others struggle for in vain. (151) ... Our fault has not been impatience.* In addition, there is a great deal of speculation and predictions connected to Hussein's intentions with WMDs. These are introduced as undoubtedly true statements about the facts: (22) ... *It became clear after the Gulf war that the WMD ambitions of Iraq were far more extensive; (162) ... Iraq is not the only regime with WMD ...; (199) I know that there are some countries or groups within countries that are proliferating and trading in WMD, especially nuclear weapons technology.* Blair asserts his speculations as unquestionable truth claims, although they are biased propositions, whose validity was refuted after the attack on Iraq. However, many of Blair's claims appear to be legitimate, especially when he speaks about proven facts or data: (19) *In April, 1991, after the Gulf war, Iraq was given 15 days to provide a full and final declaration of all its WMD; (20) Saddam had used the weapons against Iran, against his own people, causing thousands of deaths.* The expressives convey Blair's attitudes about the issue, sometimes in the form of overtly biased utterances. Blair praises 'Us' several times throughout the speech: (2) ... *it is right that this house debate this issue ...; (318) Of our armed forces - brave men and women of whom we can feel proud, whose morale is high and whose purpose is clear.* Blair legitimizes 'Our' actions by praising 'Us' consistently throughout the speech. These expressives create a subjective version of reality, displaying the speaker's evaluations about the situation. Through some commissives, Blair expresses his government's commitment related to the war against Iraq, and also emphasizes his rejection to the opposing voices: (160) ... *we will act ...; (257) ... we pass and will back it with action if Saddam fails to disarm voluntarily; (323) I will not be party to such a course.* The directives show Blair's convictions regarding the necessary attitude of the world towards Hussein's regime, and the possible resolutions: (7) ... *we must hold firm; (136) ...the world has to learn the lesson; (156) ...this indulgence has to stop; (226) ...the world should unite; (263) ... that should be part of a larger global agenda.*

Examining the level of *semantics and lexis*, iterations might reveal important features related to ideologies. The lexical density of the text is 27.2506, meaning that the proportion of content words compared to the total number of words is very low. It signifies that the speaker reiterates certain words, and focuses on few topics. Such texts with low lexical density can be

easily understood. Thus, highly ideological speeches operate with low lexical density, in order that the audience might easily comprehend the frequently repeated messages. Regarding the frequencies, the most often used words¹⁰ are *we* (66x); *our* (34x); *Iraq* (33x); *I* (32x); *Saddam* (25x); *he* (24x); *they* (23x); *now* (21x); *WMD* (20x); *should* (18x); *people* (18x); *inspector* (17x); *do* (17x); *resolution* (15x); *action* (15x); *threat* (14x); *full* (12x); *final* (11x); *declaration* (10x); *weapons* (10x).

The most frequent nouns in the text are: various types of weapons (53x); *Iraq* (33x); *Saddam* (25x); *WMD* (20x); *people* (18x); *inspectors* (17x); *world* (7x); *resolution* (15x); *action* (15x); *threat* (14x); *declaration* (10x); *weapons* (10x); *ultimatum* (9x). For visual representation of the most recurrent nouns in the speech see Figure 10. The circles of nouns referring to ‘Them’ are marked in dark grey, whereas the ones connected to ‘Us’ and his allies are represented by light grey. The differing sizes of the circles indicate the distinct emphases of the most common words, based on the frequency of their occurrences in the text.




Figure 10. The most frequent nouns related to the ‘Them’ (blue) and ‘Us’ (grey) division in Blair’s (2003) speech

By exploring the subjects of the sentences, an obvious difference might be detected between the lexical choices regarding ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. Blair focuses on the problems and the threat caused by Iraq; many parts of the speech revolve around various types of weapons recursively. Blair iterates the theme, stressing the seriousness of the issue. He gives many details about Iraq's weapons: *WMD*¹¹ (20x), *VX*¹² (5x), *mustard* (5x), *anthrax* (5x), *BW*¹³ (3x), *VX nerve agent production equipment*, *Scud missile programme*.... In light of the outcome of the issue, viz., that in fact there was no evidence concerning the presence of WMD in Iraq, this abundance of nouns related to WMD in the speech mediates a rather prejudiced judgement. As for the nouns connected to Blair, Britain and the US, the following appear most frequently: *inspectors* (17x), *resolution* (15x) and *action* (15x). The nouns related to Hussein emphasize the threat caused by weapons. Consequently, Britain might be associated with the control over the problem, by

¹⁰ The most frequently used words are mentioned without taking into account the different forms of be, and the articles.

¹¹ Weapons of mass destruction

¹² Nerve agent (O-Ethyl S-Di-IsopropylAminoethylMethylPhosphonoThiolate)

¹³ Biological weapon

inspection and action. Meanwhile, Blair does not say a word about the arsenal owned and used by the US or the UK.

As for the verbs, three are used significantly more frequently in the speech than others: *know* (13x); *act* (7x); and *disarm* (7x). The verb *know* usually refers to Blair, *act* mainly stands with 'We', and *disarm* refers to Hussein. Blair emphasizes his own knowledge about the issue and his demand for the House to act, whilst stressing that Iraq should disarm, implying that Hussein does own WMD (Figure 11).




Figure 11. The most frequently used verbs related to the 'Them' (blue) and 'Us' (grey) division in Blair's (2003) speech

Blair's adjectives highlight his message. Many of the adjectives are densely repeated: *clear* (12x); *full* (12x); *final* (11x); *Iraqi* (10x); *right* (6x); *false* (6x); *different* (6x); *dangerous* (5x); *nuclear* (5x); *unaccounted* (5x); *new* (5x). Most adjectives describe different types of weapons (*nuclear*; *biological*; *chemical*; *deadly*; *radiological*), unsurprisingly, as weapons are at the centre of the speech. Besides this, Blair seems to concentrate on the negative portrayal of Hussein and his regime. The adjectives describing Hussein and Iraq paint a strongly negative picture: *dangerous* (5x); *tyrannical* (2x); *barbaric*; *evil*; *perverted*; *violent*; *grim*; *devastating*. The most frequent adjectives referring to 'Us', are *right* (6x) and *clear* (6x), both denoting positive qualities. The description of "Us" is also negative in some cases, especially when Blair criticizes 'Our' hesitation to attack Iraq. The overall focus on 'Their' negative attributes instead of 'Our' positive ones creates a gloomy atmosphere throughout the whole speech (Figure 12).




Figure 12. The most frequent adjectives related to the 'Them' (blue) and 'Us' (grey) division in Blair's (2003) speech

A major ideological device at the *syntactic level* is the placement of important topics in subject positions. Blair draws the audience's attention to important topics in focal positions. He uses the pronoun 'We' most often in a subject position, which may well signal his intention to involve the audience in the case. On the other hand, Blair, by using 'We' instead of 'I', might blur his unique personal responsibility regarding the issue. It must be noted, that in Blair's speech there are no unique and homogenous 'Us' and 'Them' categories. The speaker constructs two 'Us' categories; one refers to the British government and the parliament. The other 'Us' reflects a wider category; the UN, the Security Council, the inspectors, the USA, the whole world, and everyone who is against Hussein. However, some elements of the second 'Us' are represented as 'Them' in some cases. Those who are originally part of the 'Us' category become 'Them' when mentioned in connection with their hesitation to support the war against Iraq. In these cases, this second 'Us' is constructed, containing only the speaker and the participants who support the attack of Iraq. Therefore there is a 'Them', which represents each participant who does not support the second 'Us' in its intention to attack Iraq; the UN, France, and the world. Nonetheless, the most important 'Them' is Saddam, Iraq, the terrorists and other dictatorships or groups who have, or are in production of WMDs. A third 'Them' implies the Iraqi people who suffer from Saddam's cruelty. The synonyms used for the subject 'we' (*people, the country and the parliament, Britain and the world, inspectors...*) are of concepts which show some kind of 'togetherness' or close bonds. Meanwhile, the subjects associated with Hussein (*WMD, Hitler, danger, problem, darkness, threat*) convey negative, troublesome meanings. With these antagonistic meanings in focal positions Blair expresses his own beliefs, and creates an 'ideological conflict' between 'Us' and the 'enemy' (Figure 13).




Figure 13. Contrasting concepts in subject positions signalling 'Us' and 'Them' in Blair's (2003) speech

The subjects of the sentences and their relation to their predicates reveal further important features of the speech. 'We' as a subject appears 66 times in the text, emphasizing Blair's unity with his government and his allies as well as with the nation. Besides this, *Blair* in a subject position is portrayed as a participant who has allies and friends, who is integrated into the system, a potent actor in his friendly political world. In contrast, the pronoun 'they' occurs 23 times. Saddam Hussein is mostly described in line with his weapons, alienated even from his own people. He is syntactically and textually encoded as an isolated individual.

3.4 Manipulation

At the *pragmatic level*, Blair's speech acts realise manipulation in several ways. On the one hand, the speaker's privileged position in terms of possessing information is highlighted by an abundant use of representatives. Blair has special access to information: (22)¹⁴ ... *It became clear after the Gulf war that the WMD ambitions of Iraq were far more extensive than hitherto thought; (200) I know there are companies, individuals, some former scientists on nuclear weapons programmes, selling their equipment or expertise.* Obviously, the majority of these propositions are exclusively owned by the speaker. The audience take part in the communicative event as passive recipients, whereas Blair's role is active and informative. On the other hand, as mentioned in 3.3, representatives are capable of manipulating the audience through transmitting the speaker's subjective opinion. The majority, approximately 52 per cent of Blair's representatives relay judgement, rather than fact. Since facts, such as (20)... *Saddam had used the weapons against Iran, against his own people, causing thousands of deaths...*, and subjective opinions (21)... *He had had plans to use them against allied forces...*, are shuffled in the speech, it is easier for the speaker to share his biased propositions as truth. With his representatives, Blair extends the opposition between 'Us' and 'Them', mentioning Britain, the US and the rest of the world as a unit facing major security threats coming from Iraq. Blair's prestige is therefore increased, as opposed to Hussein's. 'Our' actions are positively evaluated whilst Blair highlights the difference between 'Us' and 'Them' by praising 'Us' while blaming 'Them': (3) ...*That is our democracy that is our right but that others struggle for in vain.* ↔ (197)... *Tyrannical regimes with WMD and extreme terrorist groups who profess a perverted and false view of Islam ...* The inequality entails not only the increase of 'Our' value in general, but it also gives strength to the speaker himself, who is himself one of 'Us'. Moreover, representatives can be various forms of dissimulation; lying, blurring and defocusing. In a major part of the speech, Blair reveals 'facts' about Iraq, its WMDs and some connected topics, though the truth value of the allegations cannot be checked by the audience. In such cases, the speaker does not have any evidence underlying his allegations, he is lying about the presence of WMD in Iraq, flouting the Gricean maxim of quality: (22) ...*the WMD ambitions of Iraq were far more extensive than hitherto thought; (162) Iraq is not the only regime with WMD. ; (164) ... any fair observer does not really dispute that Iraq is in breach and that 1441 implies action in such circumstances...; (199) I know that there are some countries or groups within countries that are proliferating and trading in WMD, especially nuclear weapons technology...* With some representatives Blair threatens his audience, though these threats are ungrounded in some cases: (15)...*the outcome of this issue will now determine more than the fate of the Iraqi regime and more than the future of the Iraqi people...; (16) ...It will determine the way Britain and the world confront the central security threat of the 21st century...* .

As mentioned earlier, it is often difficult to decide if the speaker's proposition is a lie, and in this case Blair may have also been misled about the presence of WMDs in Iraq. Nevertheless, it has already been proven that Blair had no real evidence about the existence of WMDs in Iraq when delivering his speech. Consequently, he may have consciously misled his audience. At the time of the speech, the recipients were not able to obtain sufficient background information in connection with Blair's propositions; therefore they easily became victims of the manipulative language.

Through the use of a great number of representatives, and very few commissives, Blair employs a third manipulative device and avoids taking on any real responsibility regarding the

¹⁴ The figures in brackets indicate the number of the sentence within the text presented in the Appendix.

issue. As the decision is seemingly in the hands of the Members of the Parliament, Blair does not have to commit himself to any action, nor has to face the consequences of his own decision alone. He diminishes his own responsibility by sharing information with his audience. At the same time, he offers the decision to the members of House of Commons, who do not have any other choice but to accept Blair's serious allegations.

The expressives manipulate the audience in disguised ways. Firstly, the use of emotionally loaded expressives might lead to the involvement of the audience in the case. Secondly, the expressives increase the distance between 'Us' and 'Them', and create inequality by legitimizing 'Our' actions and delegitimizing 'Their' actions. Blair introduces his speech with the strategy of positive self-presentation, and by speaking respectfully about the House of Commons: (2) *I say that is right that the House debate this issue and pass judgement*. Blair continues his positive self-presentation throughout the whole text by emphasizing his democratic values (van Dijk, 2006, p. 377). Meanwhile, Hussein's regime is never described positively.

Besides the fact that Blair, as the Prime Minister of the UK, solely by his powerful political position might be able to influence his audience, he as the knower of the truth, the seer of the future, the actor who does positive things, contrary to 'others', has undeniable potential to advise and urge his audience to act. In addition, the strong polarization between 'Us' and 'Them' creates a dissonance, which might induce the audience to accept Blair's viewpoint. As a result, after learning the 'facts' about the dangerous situation, the House has to say yes to the war. The manipulative force of the speech seems stronger if we consider the context. The House of Commons had to make a decision about going to war on the day of the speech, and the following day, 19th March 2003, Britain joined the U.S., and attacked Iraq.

Examining *semantics and lexis*, ideological polarization seems to take part in manipulative processes. Most nouns representing the 'Us' categories have a sense of abstraction. The mostly general and abstract nouns (*friends, democracy, choice, debate, matter, country*) mentioned in connection with Blair, the British and the allies have mainly positive, 'democratic' or neutral associations. The concrete nouns in connection with Iraq (*WMD, anthrax, VX, terror*) have negative and frightening associations. The nouns (phrases) when mentioned in connection with Iraq are, in many cases, names of various types of weapons, or are related to terrorism and/or danger (Figure 14).




Figure 14. Nouns in Blair's (2003) speech

The distance between Blair's democracy and Hussein's dictatorship is increased by the use of the antagonistic meanings. Thinking about 'Us' metaphorically by using abstract notions, whereas about 'Them' by using specific nouns of weapons or fear, creates a strong conflict between 'Us' and 'Them'.

The verbs describe Blair as a thoughtful, active participant in the case (*say, disrespect, believe*), whereas contrarily, the verbs related to Hussein (*destroy, weaponize, was forced, refused, comply, allow, deny*) often designate violent physical actions or revolve around the notion of ‘obedience’. The verbs, when denoting Blair’s actions, often convey mental activity, suggesting Blair’s mental and emotional involvement in the matter. The active constructions signal the speaker’s dynamism and ability to act. The verbs describing Hussein’s actions highlight his dangerous, and at the same time controlled position, since the meanings are related to the use of weapons, the refusal of cooperation, denial and failure. The picture of an unequal relationship is outlined, wherein Blair has the power to control Hussein, whose acts are destructive and whose only right is to refuse, hide or deny (Figure 15).




Figure 15. Verbs in Blair’s (2003) speech

The inequality is also enhanced by emphasizing the difference between ‘Our’ good and ‘Their’ bad qualities. A significant distinction can be seen between the adjectives portraying ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. The adjectives describing ‘Us’, in many cases are positive and progressive, whereas those in connection with Iraq are either neutral or negative. Looking at the list of adjectives, a well-marked contradiction between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ can be seen, creating tension in the speech. The adjectives describing Blair and his allies mainly take positive or neutral content; *honourable, right, tough, stark, firm, serious...* On the contrary, the adjectives describing Hussein are never positive, and in best cases are neutral, but rather they convey negative meanings, mostly related to weapons; *chemical (munitions), unquantifiable (amounts), biological (weapons), withering (indictment), final (opportunity), material (breach), nuclear (weapon)...* For the adjectives, see Figure 16.




Figure 16. Adjectives in Blair’s (2003) speech

With this contrast, the distance between the democratic UK, US and the ‘dangerous’ Iraq is emphasized. Hussein is dehumanized and encoded ambiguously in dangerous, and at the same time powerless roles by Blair’s language. The overall lexical classification of the participants relay an unequal relation between them.

Besides this, several metaphorical elements enhance the emotional effect of the speech: (240)...*the paralysis of the UN has been born out of the division*; (241)... *the heart of it has been the concept of a world...* With these, and other rhetorical devices, Blair exaggerates the seriousness of the situation, manipulating his audience to take action (van Dijk, 2006). Blair increases the significance of the matter further by using various rhetorical devices. Hyperbolic devices increase the seriousness of the situation: (137) *Looking back over 12 years, we have been victims of our own desire to placate the implacable, to persuade towards reason the utterly unreasonable, to hope that there was some genuine intent to do good in a regime whose mind is in fact evil.* With these exaggerations, Blair increases the manipulative force of his speech, portraying the situation more seriously and ‘implacable’ as it in fact is (van Dijk, 2006, p. 378).

Concerning *syntax*, combining active and passive sentences and nominalizations, Blair emphasizes his own abilities, whereas he can blur his responsibility. In contrast, using passive constructions when speaking about ‘Them’, their inability or controlled position might be emphasized, polarizing the difference between our good and their bad qualities. When the subject of the sentences is ‘Us’ and the verbs are in active voice, they indicate the dynamism and capability of the speaker: (1; 326) *I beg to move the motion...*; (2)... *I say: it is right that this house debate this issue...*; (4)... *I do not disrespect the views...*; (73) *I won’t go through all the events since then....* When Hussein or Iraq are in the subject position, the passive voice signals ‘Their’ controlled position: (42) *Iraq was forced then to release documents...*; (36) ... *Iraq was forced to admit that too was false.* When an active voice is used with the subject of Hussein, the predicates denote negative actions, therefore Saddam’s responsibility is stressed: (50) ... *Iraq refused to comply with the inspectors*; (20) *Saddam had used the weapons against Iran, against his own people...*; (76) *Iraq continues to deny...*; (86) ... *Saddam is playing the same old games...* With this, Blair draws our attention to Hussein’s harmful and dangerous activities, which activities were not controlled at the time of the speech.

Furthermore, Blair uses the passive voice in many cases when he speaks about ‘Our’ actions: (24) *Unscop, the weapons inspection team, was set up*; (33) *Military action was threatened.* Consequently, Blair seems to avoid openly taking the responsibility; he rather obscures the subjects of ‘Our’ violent actions. With nominalizations Blair also blurs the responsibility, and indirectly says that no-one is responsible for the action, however it is necessary: (6)...*to stand British troops down and turn back, or to hold firm to the course...* Blair expresses the moral superiority, credibility and vulnerability of ‘Us’, while he vilifies and discredits ‘Them’ by using polarized structures. A focus on ‘Our’ positive acts and ‘Their’ negative acts, giving few or many details, being general or specific in connection with certain topics, being vague or precise, explicit or implicit, are all effective means of manipulation in Blair’s speech.

4 Conclusions

The results of the analysis performed by the PIMI instrument imply that the characteristic signs of power, ideologies and manipulation can be detected at various linguistic levels in the political speech at hand. Synthesizing the results of the analyses of the pragmatic, semantic and syntactic levels, an overall discursive congruence can be traced. The results show that overt coercion is less significant; rather Blair applies several manipulative devices to influence his audience and to manufacture their consent. The allocation of the speech acts imply that the speaker relies on the persuasive strength of the information provided by his representatives. The speech acts also define the speaker as an omnipotent character - a knowledgeable orator, whilst

describing the other party as inferior. By the lexical classification of the participants, the speaker creates opposition and draws boundaries between 'Us' and 'Them', and communicates biased conceptualizations of reality. At the syntactic level, the concepts and communicative functions are not directly encoded; however the meticulous analysis brings them forth to conscious consideration. Thus, the unequal relationships and the contrast between the speaker and others become manifest at the syntactic level as well. By exploring the context, the interpretations of the linguistic characteristics become more significant. The rigorous analysis of the syntactic-textual system together with the context could provide valuable information regarding some hidden intentions of the speaker, as well as the broader cultural, social traits of the discourse.

In terms of the relationship between the concepts of power, ideology and manipulation, the analysis reflects the existing theories (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997; Dahl, 1957; Fowler, 1985; Gramsci, 1980; Kress, 1985; van Dijk, 1996, 1998, 2006; Weiss & Wodak, 1989, 2003). Based on the theoretical considerations and the results of the present analysis, power, ideology and manipulation seem to be strongly interconnected concepts with various overlaps. The data gained during the analysis indicate that inequality and polarization are significant elements in the case of each construct. Despite the several overlaps, each concept has its own characteristic profile. In the frames of this study, power is treated in a narrow sense, as overt coercive force. Power in a broader sense is taken as inequality, which is essential in the formation of manipulative utterances. This study clarifies the main differences between power and manipulation based on the distinction between power in a broader and narrower sense. The data also indicate that ideologies can be distinguished from manipulation, as ideologies might convey merely the true beliefs of the speaker without conscious intention of deception. Nevertheless, biased views and ideological polarization undoubtedly take part in manipulative processes. The systematic analysis of the speech shows that ideologies are necessary to produce illegitimate influence, and the process seems to be recursive. Illegitimate influence, i.e. manipulation, might enhance the power of the speaker through ideologically biased utterances.

As for the validity and the reliability of the instrument, it can be claimed that the analytical procedures are in accord with a sound theoretical and methodological basis, therefore the criteria generated for the identification of power, ideology, and manipulation truly reflect the phenomena under investigation. The appropriateness of the methods can also be justified by the relevance of the data and the integrity of the final conclusions. Secondly, as Wodak and Meyer (2009, p. 321) remark: "In discourse analyses, rigour can be linked on the one hand to the richness of detail both in the data and in the analysis presented to the reader, and on the other to the explication of the process of analysis." Therefore the description of the analytical procedures ensures the feasibility of conducting further research, and support further interpretations. It must be noted that, in exploratory inquiries using qualitative data, subjectivity cannot be eliminated, though a rich description and a thorough investigation of the available data may reduce the distorting effects of researcher bias. The results of the analysis provide some unique data dependent on the insights of the analyst, moreover, since other context constituents are also constantly changing, their modifying effects on the results must also be considered. Hence, context, including the analyst's own viewpoint, is to be studied and described in detail in line with the linguistic analysis.

It must also be noted that political discourse is a multi-faceted phenomenon, which can be explored in various ways and from different standpoints. Since the methods of the PIMI analytical instrument attempt to capture only one part of reality, presumably any text might reveal information regarding other points of view. It is also important, that power, ideology and manipulation can only manifest themselves in language use where there is a possibility of

variation. For example, certain syntactic structures of sentences are obligatory, and independent of the social situation of the discourse (van Dijk, 2008, p. 4). Therefore, the PIMI analytical instrument can focus only on those features of the text that might contribute to specific social consequences of the discourse, by influencing the beliefs or actions of the audience.

The new framework provides a systematic description of how the concepts of power, ideology and manipulation may be captured in political speeches. The detailed instructions allow a meticulous examination, thus the chances of an impressionistic, speculative analysis can be reduced. By using the framework, an overall picture of the actual cultural, social and historical context of the examined speech can also be gained. The importance of context is underlined, whereas various ways of gathering and organizing sufficient contextual data are offered. Besides this, individual interpretations and inter-subjectivity (see 2.2.1.2) are acknowledged and promoted, paired with the intention of increasing the researcher's awareness regarding their own subjective bias. As the model is built up in independent panels, further modifications are feasible, for example simplifications for special purposes. For the aforementioned reasons, the instrument is recommended for the use of foreign language learners interested in social and political issues, and is intended to be able to improve EFL learners' critical language awareness.

As the present study concentrates on an individual case, it serves only the purpose of an introduction for the new analytical instrument created to identify power, ideologies and manipulation in this special text, and to show how it can be applied to conduct an in-depth analysis of a particular text. Further evaluation and validation of the instrument will require the use of a bigger corpus, including more texts and other text types.

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APPENDIX

Tony Blair's speech on the war against Iraq made on the 18th March 2003

1. I beg to move the motion standing on the order paper in my name and those of my right honourable friends.
2. At the outset I say: it is right that this house debate this issue and pass judgment.
3. That is the democracy that is our right but that others struggle for in vain.
4. And again I say: I do not disrespect the views of those in opposition to mine.
5. This is a tough choice.
6. But it is also a stark one: to stand British troops down and turn back; or to hold firm to the course we have set.
7. I believe we must hold firm.
8. The question most often posed is not why does it matter?
9. But why does it matter so much?
10. Here we are, the government with its most serious test, its majority at risk, the first cabinet resignation over an issue of policy.
11. The main parties divided.
12. People who agree on everything else, disagree on this and likewise, those who never agree on anything, finding common cause.
13. The country and parliament reflect each other, a debate that, as time has gone on has become less bitter but not less grave.
14. So: why does it matter so much?
15. Because the outcome of this issue will now determine more than the fate of the Iraqi regime and more than the future of the Iraqi people, for so long brutalised by Saddam.
16. It will determine the way Britain and the world confront the central security threat of the 21st century; the development of the UN; the relationship between Europe and the US; the relations within the EU and the way the US engages with the rest of the world.
17. It will determine the pattern of international politics for the next generation.
18. But first, Iraq and its WMD.
19. In April 1991, after the Gulf war, Iraq was given 15 days to provide a full and final declaration of all its WMD.
20. Saddam had used the weapons against Iran, against his own people, causing thousands of deaths.
21. He had had plans to use them against allied forces.
22. It became clear after the Gulf war that the WMD ambitions of Iraq were far more extensive than hitherto thought.
23. This issue was identified by the UN as one for urgent remedy.
24. Unscm, the weapons inspection team, was set up.
25. They were expected to complete their task following the declaration at the end of April 1991.
26. The declaration when it came was false - a blanket denial of the programme, other than in a very tentative form.
27. So the 12-year game began.
28. The inspectors probed.
29. Finally in March 1992, Iraq admitted it had previously undeclared WMD but said it had destroyed them.
30. It gave another full and final declaration.
31. Again the inspectors probed but found little.
32. In October 1994, Iraq stopped cooperating with Unscm altogether.
33. Military action was threatened.
34. Inspections resumed.
35. In March 1995, in an effort to rid Iraq of the inspectors, a further full and final declaration of WMD was made.
36. By July 1995, Iraq was forced to admit that too was false.
37. In August they provided yet another full and final declaration.
38. Then, a week later, Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamal, defected to Jordan.

39. He disclosed a far more extensive BW (biological weapons) programme and for the first time said Iraq had weaponised the programme; something Saddam had always strenuously denied.
40. All this had been happening whilst the inspectors were in Iraq.
41. Kamal also revealed Iraq's crash programme to produce a nuclear weapon in 1990.
42. Iraq was forced then to release documents which showed just how extensive those programmes were.
43. In November 1995, Jordan intercepted prohibited components for missiles that could be used for WMD.
44. In June 1996, a further full and final declaration was made.
45. That too turned out to be false.
46. In June 1997, inspectors were barred from specific sites.
47. In September 1997, another full and final declaration was made.
48. Also false.
49. Meanwhile the inspectors discovered VX nerve agent production equipment, something always denied by the Iraqis.
50. In October 1997, the US and the UK threatened military action if Iraq refused to comply with the inspectors.
51. But obstruction continued.
52. Finally, under threat of action, in February 1998, Kofi Annan went to Baghdad and negotiated a memorandum with Saddam to allow inspections to continue.
53. They did.
54. For a few months.
55. In August, cooperation was suspended.
56. In December the inspectors left.
57. Their final report is a withering indictment of Saddam's lies, deception and obstruction, with large quantities of WMD remained unaccounted for.
58. The US and the UK then, in December 1998, undertook Desert Fox, a targeted bombing campaign to degrade as much of the Iraqi WMD facilities as we could.
59. In 1999, a new inspections team, Unmovic, was set up.
60. But Saddam refused to allow them to enter Iraq.
61. So there they stayed, in limbo, until after resolution 1441 when last November they were allowed to return.
62. What is the claim of Saddam today?
63. Why exactly the same claim as before: that he has no WMD.
64. Indeed we are asked to believe that after seven years of obstruction and non-compliance finally resulting in the inspectors leaving in 1998, seven years in which he hid his programme, built it up even whilst inspection teams were in Iraq, that after they left he then voluntarily decided to do what he had consistently refused to do under coercion.
65. When the inspectors left in 1998, they left unaccounted for: 10,000 litres of anthrax; a far reaching VX nerve agent programme; up to 6,500 chemical munitions; at least 80 tonnes of mustard gas, possibly more than ten times that amount; unquantifiable amounts of sarin, botulinum toxin and a host of other biological poisons; an entire Scud missile programme.
66. We are now seriously asked to accept that in the last few years, contrary to all history, contrary to all intelligence, he decided unilaterally to destroy the weapons.
67. Such a claim is palpably absurd.
68. 1441 is a very clear resolution.
69. It lays down a final opportunity for Saddam to disarm.
70. It rehearses the fact that he has been, for years in material breach of 17 separate UN resolutions.
71. It says that this time compliance must be full, unconditional and immediate.
72. The first step is a full and final declaration of all WMD to be given on 8 December.
73. I won't go through all the events since then - the house is familiar with them - but this much is accepted by all members of the UNSC: the 8 December declaration is false.
74. That in itself is a material breach.
75. Iraq has made some concessions to cooperation but no-one disputes it is not fully cooperating.

76. Iraq continues to deny it has any WMD, though no serious intelligence service anywhere in the world believes them.
77. On 7 March, the inspectors published a remarkable document.
78. It is 173 pages long, detailing all the unanswered questions about Iraq's WMD.
79. It lists 29 different areas where they have been unable to obtain information.
80. For example, on VX it says:
81. "Documentation available to Unmovic suggests that Iraq at least had had far reaching plans to weaponise VX ...
82. "Mustard constituted an important part (about 70%) of Iraq's CW arsenal ... 550 mustard filled shells and up to 450 mustard filled aerial bombs unaccounted for ... additional uncertainty with respect of 6526 aerial bombs, corresponding to approximately 1000 tonnes of agent, predominantly mustard.
83. "Based on unaccounted for growth media, Iraq's potential production of anthrax could have been in the range of about 15,000 to 25,000 litres ...
84. Based on all the available evidence, the strong presumption is that about 10,000 litres of anthrax was not destroyed and may still exist."
85. On this basis, had we meant what we said in resolution 1441, the security council should have convened and condemned Iraq as in material breach.
86. What is perfectly clear is that Saddam is playing the same old games in the same old way.
87. Yes there are concessions.
88. But no fundamental change of heart or mind.
89. But the inspectors indicated there was at least some cooperation; and the world rightly hesitated over war.
90. We therefore approached a second resolution in this way.
91. We laid down an ultimatum calling upon Saddam to come into line with resolution 1441 or be in material breach.
92. Not an unreasonable proposition, given the history.
93. But still countries hesitated: how do we know how to judge full cooperation?
94. We then worked on a further compromise.
95. We consulted the inspectors and drew up five tests based on the document they published on 7 March.
96. Tests like interviews with 30 scientists outside of Iraq; production of the anthrax or documentation showing its destruction.
97. The inspectors added another test: that Saddam should publicly call on Iraqis to cooperate with them.
98. So we constructed this framework: that Saddam should be given a specified time to fulfil all six tests to show full cooperation; that if he did so the inspectors could then set out a forward work programme and that if he failed to do so, action would follow.
99. So clear benchmarks; plus a clear ultimatum.
100. I defy anyone to describe that as an unreasonable position.
101. Last Monday, we were getting somewhere with it.
102. We very nearly had majority agreement and I thank the Chilean President particularly for the constructive way he approached the issue.
103. There were debates about the length of the ultimatum.
104. But the basic construct was gathering support.
105. Then, on Monday night, France said it would veto a second resolution whatever the circumstances.
106. Then France denounced the six tests.
107. Later that day, Iraq rejected them.
108. Still, we continued to negotiate.
109. Last Friday, France said they could not accept any ultimatum.
110. On Monday, we made final efforts to secure agreement.
111. But they remain utterly opposed to anything which lays down an ultimatum authorising action in the event of non-compliance by Saddam.
112. Just consider the position we are asked to adopt.

113. Those on the security council opposed to us say they want Saddam to disarm but will not countenance any new resolution that authorises force in the event of non-compliance.
114. That is their position.
115. No to any ultimatum; no to any resolution that stipulates that failure to comply will lead to military action.
116. So we must demand he disarm but relinquish any concept of a threat if he doesn't.
117. From December 1998 to December 2002, no UN inspector was allowed to inspect anything in Iraq.
118. For four years, not a thing.
119. What changed his mind?
120. The threat of force.
121. From December to January and then from January through to February, concessions were made.
122. What changed his mind?
123. The threat of force.
124. And what makes him now issue invitations to the inspectors, discover documents he said he never had, produce evidence of weapons supposed to be non-existent, destroy missiles he said he would keep?
125. The imminence of force.
126. The only persuasive power to which he responds is 250,000 allied troops on his doorstep.
127. And yet when that fact is so obvious that it is staring us in the face, we are told that any resolution that authorises force will be vetoed.
128. Not just opposed.
129. Vetoed.
130. Blocked.
131. The way ahead was so clear.
132. It was for the UN to pass a second resolution setting out benchmarks for compliance; with an ultimatum that if they were ignored, action would follow.
133. The tragedy is that had such a resolution issued, he might just have complied.
134. Because the only route to peace with someone like Saddam Hussein is diplomacy backed by force.
135. Yet the moment we proposed the benchmarks, canvassed support for an ultimatum, there was an immediate recourse to the language of the veto.
136. And now the world has to learn the lesson all over again that weakness in the face of a threat from a tyrant, is the surest way not to peace but to war.
137. Looking back over 12 years, we have been victims of our own desire to placate the implacable, to persuade towards reason the utterly unreasonable, to hope that there was some genuine intent to do good in a regime whose mind is in fact evil.
138. Now the very length of time counts against us.
139. You've waited 12 years.
140. Why not wait a little longer?
141. And indeed we have.
142. 1441 gave a final opportunity.
143. The first test was the 8th of December.
144. He failed it.
145. But still we waited.
146. Until January 27, the first inspection report that showed the absence of full cooperation.
147. Another breach.
148. And still we waited.
149. Until February 14 and then February 28 with concessions, according to the old familiar routine, tossed to us to whet our appetite for hope and further waiting.
150. But still no-one, not the inspectors nor any member of the security council, not any half-way rational observer, believes Saddam is cooperating fully or unconditionally or immediately.
151. Our fault has not been impatience.
152. The truth is our patience should have been exhausted weeks and months and years ago.

153. Even now, when if the world united and gave him an ultimatum: comply or face forcible disarmament, he might just do it, the world hesitates and in that hesitation he senses the weakness and therefore continues to defy.
154. What would any tyrannical regime possessing WMD think viewing the history of the world's diplomatic dance with Saddam?
155. That our capacity to pass firm resolutions is only matched by our feebleness in implementing them.
156. That is why this indulgence has to stop.
157. Because it is dangerous.
158. It is dangerous if such regimes disbelieve us.
159. Dangerous if they think they can use our weakness, our hesitation, even the natural urges of our democracy towards peace, against us.
160. Dangerous because one day they will mistake our innate revulsion against war for permanent incapacity; when in fact, pushed to the limit, we will act.
161. But then when we act, after years of pretence, the action will have to be harder, bigger, more total in its impact.
162. Iraq is not the only regime with WMD.
163. But back away now from this confrontation and future conflicts will be infinitely worse and more devastating.
164. But, of course, in a sense, any fair observer does not really dispute that Iraq is in breach and that 1441 implies action in such circumstances.
165. The real problem is that, underneath, people dispute that Iraq is a threat; dispute the link between terrorism and WMD; dispute the whole basis of our assertion that the two together constitute a fundamental assault on our way of life.
166. There are glib and sometimes foolish comparisons with the 1930s.
167. No one here is an appeaser.
168. But the only relevant point of analogy is that with history, we know what happened.
169. We can look back and say: there's the time; that was the moment; for example, when Czechoslovakia was swallowed up by the Nazis - that's when we should have acted.
170. But it wasn't clear at the time.
171. In fact at the time, many people thought such a fear fanciful.
172. Worse, put forward in bad faith by warmongers.
173. Listen to this editorial - from a paper I'm pleased to say with a different position today - but written in late 1938 after Munich when by now, you would have thought the world was tumultuous in its desire to act.
174. "Be glad in your hearts.
175. Give thanks to your God.
176. People of Britain, your children are safe.
177. Your husbands and your sons will not march to war.
178. Peace is a victory for all mankind.
179. And now let us go back to our own affairs.
180. We have had enough of those menaces, conjured up from the continent to confuse us."
181. Naturally should Hitler appear again in the same form, we would know what to do.
182. But the point is that history doesn't declare the future to us so plainly.
183. Each time is different and the present must be judged without the benefit of hindsight.
184. So let me explain the nature of this threat as I see it.
185. The threat today is not that of the 1930s.
186. It's not big powers going to war with each other.
187. The ravages which fundamentalist political ideology inflicted on the 20th century are memories.
188. The Cold war is over.
189. Europe is at peace, if not always diplomatically.
190. But the world is ever more interdependent.
191. Stock markets and economies rise and fall together.
192. Confidence is the key to prosperity.
193. Insecurity spreads like contagion.

194. So people crave stability and order.
195. The threat is chaos.
196. And there are two begetters of chaos.
197. Tyrannical regimes with WMD and extreme terrorist groups who profess a perverted and false view of Islam.
198. Let me tell the house what I know.
199. I know that there are some countries or groups within countries that are proliferating and trading in WMD, especially nuclear weapons technology.
200. I know there are companies, individuals, some former scientists on nuclear weapons programmes, selling their equipment or expertise.
201. I know there are several countries - mostly dictatorships with highly repressive regimes - desperately trying to acquire chemical weapons, biological weapons or, in particular, nuclear weapons capability.
202. Some of these countries are now a short time away from having a serviceable nuclear weapon.
203. This activity is not diminishing.
204. It is increasing.
205. We all know that there are terrorist cells now operating in most major countries.
206. Just as in the last two years, around 20 different nations have suffered serious terrorist outrages.
207. Thousands have died in them.
208. The purpose of terrorism lies not just in the violent act itself.
209. It is in producing terror.
210. It sets out to inflame, to divide, to produce consequences which they then use to justify further terror.
211. Round the world it now poisons the chances of political progress: in the Middle East; in Kashmir; in Chechnya; in Africa.
212. The removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan dealt it a blow.
213. But it has not gone away.
214. And these two threats have different motives and different origins but they share one basic common view: they detest the freedom, democracy and tolerance that are the hallmarks of our way of life.
215. At the moment, I accept that association between them is loose.
216. But it is hardening.
217. And the possibility of the two coming together - of terrorist groups in possession of WMD, even of a so-called dirty radiological bomb is now, in my judgement, a real and present danger.
218. And let us recall: what was shocking about September 11 was not just the slaughter of the innocent; but the knowledge that had the terrorists been able to, there would have been not 3,000 innocent dead, but 30,000 or 300,000 and the more the suffering, the greater the terrorists' rejoicing.
219. Three kilograms of VX from a rocket launcher would contaminate a quarter of a square kilometre of a city.
220. Millions of lethal doses are contained in one litre of Anthrax.
221. 10,000 litres are unaccounted for.
222. 11 September has changed the psychology of America.
223. It should have changed the psychology of the world.
224. Of course Iraq is not the only part of this threat.
225. But it is the test of whether we treat the threat seriously.
226. Faced with it, the world should unite.
227. The UN should be the focus, both of diplomacy and of action.
228. That is what 1441 said.
229. That was the deal.
230. And I say to you to break it now, to will the ends but not the means that would do more damage in the long term to the UN than any other course.

231. To fall back into the lassitude of the last 12 years, to talk, to discuss, to debate but never act; to declare our will but not enforce it; to combine strong language with weak intentions, a worse outcome than never speaking at all.
232. And then, when the threat returns from Iraq or elsewhere, who will believe us?
233. What price our credibility with the next tyrant?
234. No wonder Japan and South Korea, next to North Korea, has issued such strong statements of support.
235. I have come to the conclusion after much reluctance that the greater danger to the UN is inaction: that to pass resolution 1441 and then refuse to enforce it would do the most deadly damage to the UN's future strength, confirming it as an instrument of diplomacy but not of action, forcing nations down the very unilateralist path we wish to avoid.
236. But there will be, in any event, no sound future for the UN, no guarantee against the repetition of these events, unless we recognise the urgent need for a political agenda we can unite upon.
237. What we have witnessed is indeed the consequence of Europe and the United States dividing from each other.
238. Not all of Europe - Spain, Italy, Holland, Denmark, Portugal - have all strongly supported us.
239. And not a majority of Europe if we include, as we should, Europe's new members who will accede next year, all 10 of whom have been in our support.
240. But the paralysis of the UN has been born out of the division there is.
241. And at the heart of it has been the concept of a world in which there are rival poles of power.
242. The US and its allies in one corner.
243. France, Germany, Russia and its allies in the other.
244. I do not believe that all of these nations intend such an outcome.
245. But that is what now faces us.
246. I believe such a vision to be misguided and profoundly dangerous.
247. I know why it arises.
248. There is resentment of US predominance.
249. There is fear of US unilateralism.
250. People ask: do the US listen to us and our preoccupations?
251. And there is perhaps a lack of full understanding of US preoccupations after 11th September.
252. I know all of this.
253. But the way to deal with it is not rivalry but partnership.
254. Partners are not servants but neither are they rivals.
255. I tell you what Europe should have said last September to the US.
256. With one voice it should have said: we understand your strategic anxiety over terrorism and WMD and we will help you meet it.
257. We will mean what we say in any UN resolution we pass and will back it with action if Saddam fails to disarm voluntarily; but in return we ask two things of you: that the US should choose the UN path and you should recognise the fundamental overriding importance of re-starting the MEPP (Middle East Peace Process), which we will hold you to.
258. I do not believe there is any other issue with the same power to re-unite the world community than progress on the issues of Israel and Palestine.
259. Of course there is cynicism about recent announcements.
260. But the US is now committed, and, I believe genuinely, to the roadmap for peace, designed in consultation with the UN.
261. It will now be presented to the parties as Abu Mazen is confirmed in office, hopefully today.
262. All of us are now signed up to its vision: a state of Israel, recognised and accepted by all the world, and a viable Palestinian state.
263. And that should be part of a larger global agenda.
264. On poverty and sustainable development.
265. On democracy and human rights.
266. On the good governance of nations.
267. That is why what happens after any conflict in Iraq is of such critical significance.
268. Here again there is a chance to unify around the UN.

269. Let me make it clear.
270. There should be a new UN resolution following any conflict providing not just for humanitarian help but also for the administration and governance of Iraq.
271. That must now be done under proper UN authorisation.
272. It should protect totally the territorial integrity of Iraq.
273. And let the oil revenues - which people falsely claim we want to seize - be put in a trust fund for the Iraqi people administered through the UN.
274. And let the future government of Iraq be given the chance to begin the process of uniting the nation's disparate groups, on a democratic basis, respecting human rights, as indeed the fledgling democracy in Northern Iraq - protected from Saddam for 12 years by British and American pilots in the no-fly zone - has done so remarkably.
275. And the moment that a new government is in place - willing to disarm Iraq of WMD - for which its people have no need or purpose - then let sanctions be lifted in their entirety.
276. I have never put our justification for action as regime change.
277. We have to act within the terms set out in resolution 1441.
278. That is our legal base.
279. But it is the reason, I say frankly, why if we do act we should do so with a clear conscience and strong heart.
280. I accept fully that those opposed to this course of action share my detestation of Saddam.
281. Who could not?
282. Iraq is a wealthy country that in 1978, the year before Saddam seized power, was richer than Portugal or Malaysia.
283. Today it is impoverished, 60% of its population dependent on food aid.
284. Thousands of children die needlessly every year from lack of food and medicine.
285. Four million people out of a population of just over 20 million are in exile.
286. The brutality of the repression - the death and torture camps, the barbaric prisons for political opponents, the routine beatings for anyone or their families suspected of disloyalty are well documented.
287. Just last week, someone slandering Saddam was tied to a lamp post in a street in Baghdad, his tongue cut out, mutilated and left to bleed to death, as a warning to others.
288. I recall a few weeks ago talking to an Iraqi exile and saying to her that I understood how grim it must be under the lash of Saddam.
289. "But you don't", she replied.
290. "You cannot.
291. You do not know what it is like to live in perpetual fear."
292. And she is right.
293. We take our freedom for granted.
294. But imagine not to be able to speak or discuss or debate or even question the society you live in.
295. To see friends and family taken away and never daring to complain.
296. To suffer the humility of failing courage in face of pitiless terror.
297. That is how the Iraqi people live.
298. Leave Saddam in place and that is how they will continue to live.
299. We must face the consequences of the actions we advocate.
300. For me, that means all the dangers of war.
301. But for others, opposed to this course, it means - let us be clear - that the Iraqi people, whose only true hope of liberation lies in the removal of Saddam, for them, the darkness will close back over them again; and he will be free to take his revenge upon those he must know wish him gone.
302. And if this house now demands that at this moment, faced with this threat from this regime, that British troops are pulled back, that we turn away at the point of reckoning, and that is what it means - what then?
303. What will Saddam feel?
304. Strengthened beyond measure.

305. What will the other states who tyrannise their people, the terrorists who threaten our existence, what will they take from that?
306. That the will confronting them is decaying and feeble.
307. Who will celebrate and who will weep?
308. And if our plea is for America to work with others, to be good as well as powerful allies, will our retreat make them multilateralist?
309. Or will it not rather be the biggest impulse to unilateralism there could ever be.
310. And what of the UN and the future of Iraq and the Middle East peace plan, devoid of our influence, stripped of our insistence?
311. This house wanted this decision.
312. Well it has it.
313. Those are the choices.
314. And in this dilemma, no choice is perfect, no cause ideal.
315. But on this decision hangs the fate of many things:
316. Of whether we summon the strength to recognise this global challenge of the 21st century and meet it.
317. Of the Iraqi people, groaning under years of dictatorship.
318. Of our armed forces - brave men and women of whom we can feel proud, whose morale is high and whose purpose is clear.
319. Of the institutions and alliances that will shape our world for years to come."
320. I can think of many things, of whether we summon the strength to recognise the global challenge of the 21st century and beat it, of the Iraqi people groaning under years of dictatorship, of our armed forces - brave men and women of whom we can feel proud, whose morale is high and whose purpose is clear - of the institutions and alliances that shape our world for years to come.
321. To retreat now, I believe, would put at hazard all that we hold dearest, turn the UN back into a talking shop, stifle the first steps of progress in the Middle East; leave the Iraqi people to the mercy of events on which we would have relinquished all power to influence for the better.
322. Tell our allies that at the very moment of action, at the very moment when they need our determination that Britain faltered.
323. I will not be party to such a course.
324. This is not the time to falter.
325. This is the time for this house, not just this government or indeed this prime minister, but for this house to give a lead, to show that we will stand up for what we know to be right, to show that we will confront the tyrannies and dictatorships and terrorists who put our way of life at risk, to show at the moment of decision that we have the courage to do the right thing.
326. I beg to move the motion.